Spooky's Story
28 October 2010
LTC Benson,
Thank you for the opportunity to review your Thesis "THE STRATEGIC CONTRBUTIONS OF AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS WEATHERMEN" dated September 2006.
The comments I will make are intended to be personal and, ergo, not specifically related to your thesis, except as to provide some additional background, personal observations, lessons learned, etc. At some risk of insult (for who likes to be compared to a predecessor), but certainly not meant as such, I would contend that you have grasped beautifully the character and nature of the field, both as it exists and more effectively as it should in the future. I would further contend that if KRG (Keith R. Grimes) were here to read your thesis today he would not only highly approve, but in fact would say "Thats at'em" an expression rarely given and only as a compliment of the highest degree.
Primarily my comments will be directed towards our clandestine operations in Laos during the Vietnam era. I have no way of evaluating our efforts from a strategic standpoint; however, I do have a fairly clear sense of our tactical contributions, what we did right and poorly, and, I think, most importantly what lessons were learned that can be implemented in future operations. No attempt will be made to place my comments in any particular order or hierarchy, but rather just an "a staccato" presentation. Since it seems clear that you have a fairly comprehensive understanding of the mission, I will not bore you with reiteration of many of the historical or background information.
The first 2 deployments by Commando Weather Team (CWT) personnel were made as TDYs via the Waterpump Project or Project 404, thereafter all CWTs were assigned to the 10th Weather Squadron (Udorn RTAFB) for administrative purposes, but were essentially operationally under the control of the Air Attache-which in reality meant that the US Ambassador called the shots. Period.
Just for contextual purposes, I was involved almost continuously from July 1966 until September 1972, with 2 relatively short breaks in the CONUS. In general the relations of the CWT with the 10th WS were generally good, but totally dependent upon the whim of the 10th WS Commander and/or more realistically with how well the CWT OIC could understand the nature of the 10th CC and able to communicate the exigencies of the field operators to him within the parameters established via the Air Attache. Two CWT OICs were very effective at that role, Wayne Wheeler, and Carl Clarke. Others were less effective, and one was, in my opinion, totally incompetent in every aspect of leadership, communication, and personal courage.
One problem occurred with this command structure happened to me but was later rectified so that my experience was singular. On my arrival at Udorn only 3 CWTs were allowed in Laos. I made number 4 so it was decided that I should find a job for myself somewhere in Thailand where my "sheep-dip" status would not be compromised. As an aside it seems to me to be incomprehensible that an A1C(E4) would ever be given that kind of latitude-but then I was gung-ho Air Commando. Initially I went to Nahkon Phanom RTAFB (NKP) to the Air Commando base there and worked with the CCT in a civilian clothes status but would put on an unmarked flight suit to fly Candlestick (C123 flare) missions as a flare kicker or backseat with a FAC. After a few weeks someone decided that it probably wasn't too good of an idea to have a guy with no ID and no markings flying around in a combat zone (in a marked USAF aircraft), so I migrated to the Air Commando detachment at Ubon RTAFB where I started teaching weather to the Thai PARU (parachute aerial reinforcement units). The Thai PARU were actually Border Police, but I knew that they were often recruited by CAS to operate across the fence. It was there that I started learning the Thai language (which is closely related to Lao). I will come back later to specifically address issues of training indigenous people/forces. Finally, after a few months of frustration I was finally allowed in country. At this point I should also probably say that my vernacular will be a variant with what I thought at the time and how I view things retrospectively.
When I first arrived in country there was in place an established weather network the core of which was the Air America system. KRG had managed to establish a contract between USAF and Air America that provided for observations from the AA base stations and air transport for the CWTs. Both elements were vital to the success of future operations. AA base stations were located at Luang Prabang (The royal capital in NW Laos), Vientiane (The Administrative Capital on the Mekong River about 50 miles north of Udorn RTAFB, Savannakhet (On the Mekong River about 1/2 way between NKP and Ubon, Pakse (on the Mekong about 50 miles east of Ubon), and most important at that time Long Tieng(aka Lima Site 20 Alternate in north central Laos near the Plaine de Jarres, or PDJ). From a tactical standpoint LS20A was at the hub of the conflict and therefore of considerable significance. During those early years, the majority of CWT efforts were out of LS20A supporting air operations for Gen. Vang Pao and his Hmong forces.
The Air America stations were operated by Nationalist Chinese with the operational control being out of Udorn where the observations were collected and transmitted by teletype to the USAF weather station there. This was without a doubt our most reliable source of regular observations out of Laos. The initial CWTs had also spent considerable time with these primarily radio operators so they were also providing the most accurate and timely observations. The sites mentioned above were also primary launch and recovery sites for internal air operations, that is, not out of country assets. Therefore, their value is obvious. The primary air assets within Laos were Air America, Continental Air Services, and the Royal Lao A. Force (RLAF). Air America and Continental provided almost all of the transport services within the country and were completely under the control of the Agency tasked to coordinate the efforts of American and/or local ground assets. The internal tactical air was RLAF which flew T-28s with American trained Lao pilots. The exception to that was the squadron at LS20A which had Hmong pilots.
When I first arrived in country there was in place the AA network, and in northern Laos a fairly extensive number of observation sites, and in southern Laos very few except for the AA stations. The reporting stations were almost entirely static locations and consisted of a mixture operational sites. These were mostly, but not limited to, Royal Lao Army camps, Special Guerrilla Unit (SGU) bases, Hmong villages where Vang Pao's troops operated, and clandestine Thai Army Artillery units. The system itself could be best described as a patchwork of any available communications. The northern Laos network was centered at 20A which was manned by either a CWT or, more often, a Hmong hired to be a core operator. The collection station had a commercial KWM-2a HF radio, and a PRC-25 FM radio. In theory this station would collect from the outlying observation posts and retransmit the data to Air American in Vientiane via radio. In reality it was often the case that the collected data was hand delivered to the AA station at 20A and forwarded to Vientiane by them. Field operation observation posts had a variety of communication systems, but the most reliable sites were equipped with the PRC-47 HF radio, which were always scarce and required constant service to keep a battery supply in stock.
After an initial period in northern Laos, it was decided that I should attempt to expand our system in southern Laos. Because the "hot" war at that time was in the north, the majority of CWT activity had been concentrated in that region, but southern Laos was the location of a large portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail system. As air interdiction increased the need for expanded local data became of increasing importance. Southern Laos was divided into two military regions (MR III & IV). MR III was the northerly portion of the southern panhandle and MR IV the southerly half. It was in those two areas that I spent the next few years. Here I have made the distinction because the conditions in the two MRs were radically different. In Savannakhet (MR III) there was a detachment of Air Commandos primarily there to advise and support the RLAF squadron there with everybody residing in the AirA house and under the primary control of the Air Attache in Vientiane. In Pakse (MR IV) the situation from the Air Commando standpoint was essentially the same. It quickly became apparent to me that I needed to detach myself to some degree so I set up a separate residence/shop in each location. The reason for this was quite simple. The Air Commando operations at both locations were static and centered on activities at the respective airfields. My principal operations were not centered there, but rather in the outlying locations. Even though I was not directly under the command of the detachment commander, many detachment commanders attempted to control (counterproductively) my activities and often attempted to just use me as an extra hand (bomb loader, house boy, radio operator, whatever). One should not mistake that to mean that I was unwilling to "pitch in" when and where I could, because as time and circumstance allowed I did. It was in this arena that the CWT OIC could be most effective. Most were, some not.
As I alluded to earlier, the 2 MRs were significantly different; however, when I could use American controlled assets, my success was nearly equal in both. In both regions my best and most consistent operating stations were the American controlled SGU camps. I was never able to acquire any Royal Lao Army stations in MR III, so I made the AA station my central collection point. As in the north my primary communication network was with PRC-47 and PRC-25s, again with all the inherent problems of battery supply. Initially I had no PRC-25s; however, by the judicious acquisition of a C-130 load of plywood I was able to trade with an acquaintance in Vietnam for 60 PRC-25s. These FM radios then became the backbone of the southern Laos nets. Unlike MR III, MR IV was commanded by a General Manivong who was a fighting general like Gen. Vang Pao in the North. Also, the Station Chief at Pakse provided me with all the PRC-47s that I needed for placement in the SGU camps and even a few for RL Army camps. By a handshake agreement with the Agency Airfield supervisor, I acquired a secure building and hired the daughter of Gen. Manivong as my collecting agent (It was a smart political decision that opened many a portal). This was the core of my MR IV data collection system with a KWM-2a and PRC-25. Additionally, there were also UHF and VHF radios which were principally used for collecting PIREPS from RLAF pilots. Part of the reason for having that set-up reverts to my agreement with the airfield supervisor, that my facility could be used by Agency people in the event that the Air Operations center should be incapacitated for any reason. To my knowledge that happened only once and that happened during the first attempt to recapture the Boloven Plateau a time of critical air operations, so it was deemed a valued asset by all concerned.
About the time that I first arrived in southern Laos a fund became available with which we could pay a stipend to our observers. Here is how I chose to distribute those funds. For each observer who transmitted two or more observations every day of the month they were paid $10. Four or more $18, and six or more $25. That may not sound like much, but in context, an unmarried army p. ate was paid $7/month. This is how it worked. An initial fund was provided from which I paid the observers, then each month I would visit each site to pay them, have them sign a receipt then monthly go the Air Attache in Vientiane and receive that amount in the local currency (Kip). That later changed so I would have to make receipts in US dollars then take those to Accounting and Finance at Udorn RTAFB, get the monies in USD then convert that on the local market to Kip. Some of the benefits to having a paid observer were: it required at least once a month visit to each site which was not only payday but also an opportunity to evaluate and provide additional training, it opened many doors (I am sure each on site unit commander got his cut out of that), and it provided a motivation for more data transmissions. Additionally, my observers were always on hand when payday came (a situation not always so initially).
At this juncture I would like to discuss training and language issues/problems. First language. Most CWTs were in Laos either for 6 months or more commonly 1 year. Most of the observers that were trained spoke no English or occasionally poorly; therefore, they had to be taught in their native language(s). For most CWTers that required and interpreter. To my knowledge only Pete Morris, Frank West, and myself (and to a lesser extent Maurice Kunkel) ever had enough linguistic ability to do that. For those who needed an interpreter it seldom dawned on them that they needed to train the interpreter in the vagaries of weather phenomena and measurement, no matter what level of English skill that individual had. In spite of my individual fluency, I hired a native Lao, a Seesumak Thongoulay, trained him extensively and we usually would together conduct our training of new observers. As an aside, I married his sister a couple of years later. One problem with him was that it took almost a year before the Agency would allow him into the SGU camps and then with only restricted access. Closely related to the language problem were issues of training third world indigenous people. Imagine trying to explain, for example, cloud height to a people whose linear concepts were limited to such things as a day’s walk or half a day to climb a mountain. Or that temperature is limited to hot, hotter, or cold, colder. Or direction where east is only "where the sun comes up". It is not easy, but measurement techniques can be taught on an individual basis, but that will always be on an individual basis predicated on what is locally available and understood. It is relatively easy, for example, to teach how to mechanically read a thermometer, or prepare a compass rose, or provide a pictorial of cloud height based on a nearby mountain. If visibility markers are available, it is quite simple to prepare a chart for that. Much more difficult is training to assess visibility based on obscuring phenomena when landmarks are few or nonexistent. It was not uncommon for an observation site in Laos to be located in a camp where the actual extent of visual observation was the jungle tree line at the edge of the are cleared around a camp for defense purposes. Another, never resolved, problem for our operations in Laos was the code that we used was an English alphabetic one. Even though the description of the phenomena observed was written in Lao the data was transmitted by voice as an English phonetic alphabet. In some cases, I actually spent some time teaching an observer to read and phonetically pronounce that English letter. However, I did prepare a Lao transliteration, but even that took some time for the receiving station to become accustomed to. Because Lao has no "L" or "R" syllabic ending pronounced as such, when used literally in transliterated mode it came out sounding like Ow-la-fa, Ba-ra-fo, Cha-ra-lee, etc. I was never able to find a good transliterate venue for "delta,” so it just became denta. To my knowledge it was never used outside of southern Laos.
Here I end my little narrative with two recommendations, the first is based on my personal knowledge, and the second a look to the future. First, should another similar scenario as Laos again come under the purvey of the Special Operation Weatherman, that team(s) be specifically trained in the meteorology of the region and the language(s) and culture(s) of that region be given special attention, provided time allows, and the commitment is anticipated to be long term. This implies that frequent rotation is detrimental unless the "pipeline" is even more specifically educated for that operation. The second is that I think the SOWT needs to prepare beyond the current battlefields and have some capability for insertion and/or movement in a more maritime environment. By that I mean, but not limited to, SCUBA, submersibles, smaller naval (especially riverine) vessels, etc.
Feel free to use this minor composition in any way that you so choose, and should you desire further expansion of subject, or clarification I will be happy to do what I can.
Wayne E "Spook" Fuiten, MSgt, CWT, SWWT, SOWT, CCT, Ret, PhD